Abstract
Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) composing of a large number of sensor nodes can be deployed in any unattended environment such as military target tracking and surveillance, natural disaster relief, biomedical health monitoring and hazardous environment sensing. The sensor nodes are small in size and capable to sense and process data. A WSN is designed to detect events, collect and process data and transmit sensed information to interested users. Basic features of WSNs have limitations on energy, transmission power, memory and computing power. They make WSNs different from the other wireless ad hoc or mesh networks [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . Many security solutions for wireless networks can be applied to WSNs directly. However, several unique characteristics, which include hostile environment, limited resources, in-network processing and application-specific architectures, of WSNs require new security mechanisms [6] .
Security and privacy are very critical for the success of WSNs. WSN is subject to various attacks due to the unique characteristics, such as eavesdropping, modification, interception, insertion and deletion. Therefore, basic security mechanisms like authentication, confidentiality and integrity are essential services for WSNs. This paper is focused on authentication and key agreement for confidentiality, which could combined into authenticated key agreement. The network environment we consider is that users want to log into a WSN via gateway node (GWN). However, it is not easy to access real time data from the sensor nodes via GWN only. Thereby, user needs to take direct access to the sensor nodes to acquire data whenever he (or she) requires.
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To provide security and privacy in WSNs, There are many research efforts until now [7-] . Wong et al. firstly proposed a hash based user authentication scheme over WSNs, which is less complex, light weight and dynamic [7] . But some works showed that it is vulnerable to stolen-verifier, replay, and forgery attacks. Das proposed a two factor method of user authentication, which implements password based authentication with the aid of GWN and is suitable for resource -constrained WSNs [8] . Unfortunately, the scheme has some security flaws and does not provide mutual authentication and key agreement. After that, series of security schemes are proposed to improve the scheme [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . Recently, Xue et al. proposed a temporal credential based mutual authentication and key agreement scheme for WSNs, which only involves hash and XOR operations [12] . However, Jiang et al. showed that Xue et al.'s scheme is weak against identity guessing attack, tracking attack, privileged insider attack and stolen smart card attack. Furthermore, Jiang et al. proposed an efficient two factor user authentication scheme with unlinkability and argued that their scheme is secure against various security attacks [13] .
First of all, this paper shows security weaknesses in Jiang et al.'s user authentication scheme focused on the requirement of global time synchronization and the lack of forward secrecy in the session key. Furthermore, this paper proposes an authenticated key agreement scheme with forward secrecy to solve the weaknesses in Jiang et al.'s scheme. It provides user anonymity and un-traceability by adopting dynamic identifier depending on each session's random number.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, network configuration on WSNs is reviewed to understand the network environment. Section 3 reviews Jiang et al.'s user authentication scheme and Section 4 shows weakness analyses on it. An enhanced authenticated key agreement scheme is proposed to solve the weakness problems in Jiang et al.'s scheme and to provide the forward secrecy in Section 5. In Section 6, we provide security analysis for the proposed authenticated key agreement scheme. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Network Configuration
This section briefly reviews Xue et al.'s network configuration for the better understanding Jiang et al.'s scheme and the proposed scheme for WSNs [12] . Xue et al.'s network configuration provides five basic models but this paper only will consider a specific model that user only could access data on the sensor nodes via GWN but not directly from them. The model is consisted with three main parties as shown in Fig. 1 , which are user, GWN, and sensor nodes over a WSN.
Figure 1. WSN Network Configuration
GWN plays an important role in the network. In order to further reach the specific sensor node, remote user is required to reach GWN through Internet at first. Contrary, sensing data from the sensor nodes firstly gets to GWN and further reaches the end user. If the data in the WSN is made available to the remote user on demand, mutual authentication between them must be ensured before allowing the remote user to access. With the aid of GWN, impenetrability of lightweight mutual authentication is going to be possible. Since the sensor nodes are deployed in harsh environments, authentication of the GWN is necessary for the user and the sensor node. Three parties have the following functionalities User: To read data on the sensor nodes over the WSN, user needs to have rights to access them via GWN, which requires to be registered on the GWN. GWN: GWN works as an authentication server over the WSN and intervenes between user and the sensor nodes.
Sensor node: To provide sensed data, it only communicates with the authenticated GWN not with the user.
Jiang User Authentication Scheme
This section reviews Jiang et al.'s efficient two-factor user authentication scheme with unlinkability for WSNs [13] . Jiang et al.'s user authentication scheme is consisted with three phases: registration phase, login and authentication phase, and password update phase
Registration Phase
User registers with GWN. A new user U i proceeds with the following steps through a secure channel.
Step The registration phase for SNs is described as follows.
Step 1: S j submits it's identifier SID j to GWN through a secure channel.
Step 2: Upon receiving the message, GWN computes TC j =H(K GWN-S ||SID j ), where K GWN-S is the GWN's private key and TC j is the temporal credential for S j . Finally, GWN sends TC j to S j .
Step 3: After receiving the message, S j stores TC j as its temporal credential.
Login and Authentication Phase
Step 1: U i inserts his/her smart card to a terminal and enters ID i and PW i . The terminal generates a timestamp TS 4 and randomly chooses a key K i and computes
, and 
Weakness Analysis On Jiang Et al.'s Scheme
This section provides weakness analyses on Jiang et al.'s user authentication scheme. The scheme has bad effect due to the usage of global time synchronization and furthermore, does not provide forward secrecy against the established session key.
Global Time Synchronization
Due to the collaborative nature of sensor nodes over WSNs, many applications require global time synchronization. Several time synchronization algorithms have been proposed for WSNs [14] [15] [16] [17] . However, many of the schemes were not designed with security in mind. Song et al. provided vulnerabilities in most existing time synchronization schemes as follows [18] Masquerade attack: Suppose that a node A sends a reference beacon to its two neighboring nodes B and C. An attacker E can pretend to be B and exchange wrong time information with node C, disrupting the time synchronization process between nodes B and C.
Replay attack: Using the same scenario in the masquerade attack, attacker E can replay node B's old timing packets, misleading node C to be synchronized to a wrong time.
Message manipulation attack: In this attack, an attacker may drop, modify, or even forge the exchanged timing messages to interrupt the time synchronization process.
Delay attack: The attacker deliberately delays some of the time messages, e.g., the beacon message in the reference broadcast synchronization scheme in [14] , to fail the time synchronization process. Note that this attack cannot be defended by cryptographic techniques. Thereby, it is not easy to establish a synchronized time over a WSN and thereby, it is better to not use timestamp based technique in the security schemes. However, the freshness of the message in Juang et al.'s scheme is based on the timestamp, TS i .
Forward Secrecy
Jiang et al. argued that their scheme is secure against various attacks and provides good properties. However, this section shows that Jiang et al.'s scheme does not provide forward secrecy, which is necessary property to be supported in the key agreement scheme. We need to have an assumption that attacker could get the system's long term secret keys K GWN-U and K GWN-S as the normal assumption to the forward secrecy. Also, we need another assumption that attacker also could steal and read the verification table stored in the GWN [19] .
For the attack, first of all, an attacker could get { TID i , ID i , TE i } from the verification 6 ), where PKS j and TS 6 are from the intercepted message in advance between GWN and U i . Then, the attacker could derive the session key KEY ij '=H(K i 'K j ') properly. Thereby, Jiang et al.'s scheme does not provide forward secrecy.
Proposed Authenticated Key Agreement Scheme
This section proposes an authenticated key agreement scheme with forward secrecy over WSNs to solve the weakness problems in Jiang et al.'s scheme. The aim of the proposed scheme is to remove the usage of the global time synchronization over WSN and is to provide forward secrecy. The proposed scheme is composed of three phases, registration, login and authenticated key agreement, and password update.
Registration Phase
Let K GWN-U and PU GWN-U =g K GWN-U denote GWN's private key and its corresponding public key, where s is kept secret by GWN and PU GWN-U is stored inside each user's smart card. When a user, U i wants to be registered to the GWN, U i proceeds with the following steps through a secure channel.
Step 1: U i selects a unique identity ID i and a password PW i , and generates a random number r. Then he (or she) computes RPW i =H(r||PW i ) and submits the registration request {ID i , RPW i } to GWN. The registration phase for sensor nodes is described as follows.
Step 2: Upon receiving the message, GWN computes TC j =H(K GWN-S ||SID j ) and PU GWN-S =g K GWN-S , where K GWN-S is the GWN's private key, PU GWN-S is another public key of the GWN for sensor nodes, and TC j is the temporal credential
Forward Secrecy
We could have the same assumptions as in Juang et al.'s security analysis that attacker could get the system's long term secret keys K GWN-U and K GWN-S and could steal and read the smart card of U i . Then, attacker could get { H(·), g, PTC i , PU GWN-U } from the smart card and { PU i , DID i , C i }, {DID i , PU i , C GWN }, {SID j , PU j , C j , C ij } and {SID j , PU j , C ij , E GWN } from the intercepted messages among U i , GWN and S j . There is only way that the attacker could get the session key KEY ij by knowing K i or K j from PU i and PU j , respectively. However, they are based on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problems. Furthermore, even GWN could not compute the session key KEY ij between U i and S j neither. Thereby, the proposed scheme could provide forward secrecy.
Resilience of Password Guessing Attack
We could assume that an attacker could get a legal user's smart card and read the memory on it and any intercepted messages on the process of the scheme run. Then only information the attacker could get are { H(·), g, PTC i , PU GWN-U } from the memory of the smart card. Additionally, the attacker could get the intercepted messages of { PU i , DID i , GWN } from the previous sessions. Even if the attacker could get the information, it is not possible to derive the password PW i or the identifier ID i from them due to the one-wayness of the hash function. There is only PTC i that the attacker could have, which is related with the password. To find the correct password, the attacker needs to know r, ID i , and K GWN-U at the same time. However, there is no way that the attacker knows these values. Thereby, it is impossible to perform password guessing attack against the proposed scheme.
Resilience Of Replay Attack
Suppose that an attacker could intercept the messages { PU i , DID i , C i }, {DID i , PU i , C GWN }, {SID j , PU j , C j , C ij } and {SID j , PU j , C ij , E GWN } from the previous sessions. Then the attacker tries to replay these messages in a certain session. However, the proposed scheme uses session fresh random numbers K i or K j and they effects to each message's integrity check value C. Thereby, it is impossible to perform replay attack against the proposed scheme.
Resilience of User Identity Guessing Attack
Suppose that an attacker could intercept the messages { PU i , DID i , C i }, {DID i , PU i , C GWN }, {SID j , PU j , C j , C ij } and {SID j , PU j , C ij , E GWN } from the previous sessions. Then the attacker tries to get certain parameters from these messages, but these messages are treated to be random strings due to the randomness of K i and K j and the uniqueness of C i , C GWN , C j , and C ij . Therefore, in case of the attacker does not know about these K i and K j , the attacker will face to solve the discrete logarithm problem to get the correct identity from DID i . Hence, the proposed scheme can resist from the user identity guessing attack.
Conclusion
This paper has shown the weakness analyses on Jiang et al.'s recent user authentication scheme for WSNs. They were the requirement of global synchronization time and lack of forward secrecy to the session key. Furthermore, we proposed an authenticated key agreement scheme with forward secrecy over WSNs to solve the weaknesses in Jiang et al.'s scheme. The proposed scheme does not use global synchronized time stamp but use session dependent random numbers to provide session freshness. It provides user anonymity and un-traceability by adopting dynamic identifier depending on each session's random numbers. The proposed authenticated key agreement scheme could be used as a security building block for the WSNs security.
